Ahmad 
The volatile security landscape in western Libya presents a picture of the fragile political path that the United States and Western powers are trying to exploit in search of balances that preserve Western interests and pay the price for Libya.
Tripoli and its countryside are witnessing frequent clashes between rival forces, at a time when the political process continues to falter, amid new attempts led by the new UN envoy to Libya, American Stephanie Khoury, to revive it in line with the new Western competition for Libya.
The clashes, even if they are limited at times, it appear as tests of strength to influence the Libyan theater in general and not only on a specific region or city, as they ultimately clarify special elements within the political composition that the outgoing government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh deals with and seeks to place it within the political track leading to elections.
In practice, the clashes ignite quickly and then stop without any impact on the level of distribution of armed factions, or even the ability of the deployment of Libyan security forces to prevent these frictions, as the moves of the Ministry of Interior in the dismissed Government of National Unity appear as an attempt to impose a balance between the armed factions and not a deterrent force to end the armed presence, and despite statements about a comprehensive plan aimed at cleansing the capital Tripoli and its western surroundings of armed groups, the repeated clashes pose a fundamental issue that is not only related to the ability of the Dbeibeh government to control the areas of clashes, but in the nature of the “centers of power” in Tripoli, which practically prevent stabilization, the imposition of order and the end of the armed presence.
Security interference
The recent clashes in the city of “Gemayel” are inseparable from the broader political context of the problem, as the security institutions in Tripoli are not far from the deployed armed formations, as they are part of a security formation in which the special accounts of the leaders of the security apparatus are mixed with the armed groups deployed in the different regions in western Libya, and the most obvious example of this: the recent clashes between the elements of the Stabilization Support Service, headed by Ghenioa Al-Kikli, and members of the Judicial Police, near the Jendouba Bridge between the cities of Al-Asaba and Gharyan, which It erupted mainly after stabilization agents tried to smuggle prisoners belonging to the 555th Brigade that the Judicial Police transported from Jendouba prison to the Gharyan court complex.
This form of competition prevails among security leaders, who often rely on local loyalties to extend their control and achieve superiority beyond the political process or attempts to reach elections that end the existing diaspora, which prompted a member of the House of Representatives, Ali Tekbali, to question the statements of the Minister of Interior in charge of the outgoing government of Dbeibeh, Imad Trabelsi, about the presence of 420,000 affiliates in the security sector of his ministry, considering that this figure is exaggerated in relation to the population in Libya.
This figure (420,000), if true, in turn opens the door to many questions, as it seems very large in a country of seven million people, in the east of which there is another government, which means that out of every ten people in western Libya there is a person affiliated with the security, so what is the cause of this chaos?
These statements reflect not only the government’s failure to achieve security stability, but also the failure of the “de facto” forces that impose themselves even on official security institutions, as protests and civil disobedience carried out by the people, especially in Gemayel, Manshiyya, Raqdalin and Zaltan, are only one manifestation of despair over the status quo, while the demand for the departure of militias and the restoration of normal life shows an impossible situation in light of the intertwining of the interests of the “centers of power” in the Dbeibeh government and the leaders of armed groups.
A “virtual” role for security forces
The central question in light of the state of lawlessness is related to the effectiveness of the security sector of the Ministry of Interior and its role in restoring stable security conditions, as the unification of the security services under a central command even if it appears within the political positions is a general political demand, but it contradicts the general policies of the Dbeibeh government and also contradicts the mechanism pursued by the United States in dealing with the Libyan issue, as the United States of America has made contacts with armed factions in western Libya, and it is training armed groups in Tripoli through American military contractors. In coordination with the U.S. State Department, in the shadows and directly away from the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), it suggests that it is primarily an intelligence activity to draw special balances between armed groups.
In practice, the main dependence of the Libyan Interior is based on the plans and assistance provided by the United States through the private security companies such as “Amentum”, as these efforts aim to secure strategic areas such as the Al-Watiya military base, which makes the establishment of a security system difficult in light of two basic issues:
- The first is the distribution of influence to the Libyan security forces affiliated with the Dbeibeh government according to a form of competition and alliance with the various armed factions, and in this way, the survival of armed groups is part of the interests of some parties to the security services.
- The second is related to the US vision of the security situation, as its focus is on securing specific military sites that can be used for logistical support for its presence, while leaving the task of dealing with armed factions to private security companies and the US intelligence service based in Libya.
The image of the Libyan West illustrates a more complex issue than the course of the elections, because it summarizes the vision of the American and Western strategy in general for the future of their interests in Libya, as they are primarily concerned with strengthening their influence regardless of the way in which this is done, and they also seek to draw the political process according to these interests, while the security situation provides them with an opportunity to draw balances in a way that suits their ambitions, as the unification of the security services is primarily a political process and not measures to train some elements or strengthen the security apparatus, which confirms Only a shared political vision for Libyans can chart a political course that ultimately imposes a stable security situation.
Written by Mazen Bilal
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