Ahmad 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s massive emergence after the fall of the radio building in Omdurman raised questions about their political return after the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime.
It seemed remarkable that the “Al-Baraa bin Malik Brigades” rushed to declare victory, despite the fact that battles were raging along Sudan and not only in Omdurman, and the Sudanese army’s restoration of the headquarters of radio and television was surrounded by a special symbolism, in which the intensive appearance of military and political leaders associated with the Muslim Brotherhood carried many indicators, as the “Al-Baraa” battalion linked to the “Popular Defense Forces” was established in 1989, and includes Islamist armed groups that fought alongside the army in multiple areas.
In 2020, the army announced the dissolution of the Popular Defense and its transformation into reserve forces affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, but this did not disrupt the network that political Islam worked to build.
Raw image
The Brotherhood organization has provided political and media support to the Sudanese army since the beginning of the confrontations in April last year, and the “Al-Baraa” battalion formed a model of a tangled scene between political Islam and the conflict in Sudan, and the events that accompanied this group show that it is strongly involved in the war on the side of the army, as its current commander, “Al-Misbah Abu Zeid Talha Ibrahim”, assumed command after the killing of “Muhammad Al-Fadl” and the arrest of “Anas Omar” by the Rapid Support Forces.
There is a clear link between the Bin al-Baraa Brigade and the dissolved National Congress Party, according to an analysis of data released by Sudanese Islamist websites.
On the other hand, the Brotherhood’s media platforms began to glorify the role of the so-called “mujahideen” and the cadres of the Islamic movement in the conflict and in the battle of Omdurman in particular, and some analysts pointed out through social media platforms that the fall of the radio and television building is the beginning of the return of the Brotherhood movement to power, which is an indication of the threat of the end of the role of political parties that led the change since 2019 after the overthrow of the Brotherhood’s three-decade rule, and this is reinforced by the statements attributed to Ali. Karti, Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement, categorically rejected any ceasefire or negotiated solutions, confirming the deep political dimensions between the army’s military operations and the position of political Islam in the Sudanese scene.
The Army and Political Islam
According to the dynamics of the Sudanese army, the development of the war prompted it to introduce armed movements alongside the regular forces, and this was not difficult given the history of the army with the Islamic movements that took a special form with the 1989 coup, led by General Omar al-Bashir, where the front played a decisive role in organizing the coup, and mixed Islamic activity with military force, which led to the emergence of a model in governance that deeply integrates Islamic principles with the functions of the state, and the front basically emerged from the cadres of the Brotherhood movement Muslims, and attracted some Islamic forces in Sudan to form a single front against other parties, and took a different dynamic from the legacy of the political Islam movement through its network of relations within the army and the ruling authority.
During Omar al-Bashir’s rule, a comprehensive program of Islamization was adopted, and the Islamic Front, taking advantage of its influence within the military, implemented Islamic law, Arabized education, and established an Islamic economic system.
The military’s support has facilitated the entrenchment of the Islamist movement’s values within the fabric of the Sudanese state and society, and the Brotherhood’s media strategy plays a pivotal role, and its extensive network includes websites, television channels, and significant investments in companies specializing in spreading news via social media, aimed at strongly influencing public opinion.
The relationship between the Islamic Movement and the Sudanese army embodies a complex interaction between ideology and power and attempts to shape the current conflicts in Sudan according to an equation dating back to the stage of the political system of former President Omar al-Bishr.
The Brotherhood. Complex network
Political Islam in general and the Muslim Brotherhood movement in particular does not represent a Sudanese political dynamic only, it is a construction intertwined with regional and international policies as well due to the interdependence with the space of political Islam globally, even the framework of regional alliances appears according to the political Islam movement between the two parties to the conflict in Sudan, and this is evident through reports that talk about the UAE’s support, through its policy against political Islam, for the Rapid Support Forces, while Turkey supports the army, as several reports talked about Turkish marches that have been It was sent to the Sudanese army, and directly contributed to its successes in the battles of Omdurman.
On the other hand, the Brotherhood movement relies on international financial, media and military networks, and has established over three decades extensive interconnected relations with political decision centers regionally and even internationally, where it began as small networks but expanded within the army and security forces, and the fall of Bashir raised questions about the future of the Islamic movement in Sudan, but the war today makes it clear that the movement is an important factor not only in battles, but also in drawing the space of army relations at the regional level.
Since the first coup of the Brotherhood in 1959, only three years after Sudan gained independence from British rule, attempts to influence them on the troubled Sudanese scene remained, and drew with them the lines of regional and international interventions, as political Islam in the end is a picture of wide fronts that are not limited to Sudan’s political borders, but include various extensions within the network of international interests.
Written by Nidal Al-Khedary
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