Hommam Al Nassim 
Operation “Irini” presents the European perception of the Mediterranean Sea as a vital space for the “old” continent. It is an arena for settling scores, regardless of the goals that the Europeans put forward for this operation.
Before “Irini,” there was Operation “Sofia,” which was officially named the European Union Operation for the Mediterranean. It was a naval mission launched by the European Union in June 2015 to combat human smuggling networks in the Mediterranean. The name was named after Sophia, a child born on… On board one of the European rescue ships, but the “humanitarian character” that the name of the operation carries does not reflect the “European strategy” of it, as it collided with the intertwining of international and regional interests in Libya, and the failure to implement the UN embargo on the supply of weapons to Libya, which was the result of critical balances of the groups’ alliances. Armed forces at the international and regional levels.
In March 2020, Operation Sophia was replaced by a new operation called “IRINI”, which focused more on enforcing the arms embargo on Libya, and as its stated goal sought to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2292 of 2016, which allows the inspection of ships in the highlands. Seas suspected of violating the arms embargo imposed on Libya, in addition to other tasks that include training the Libyan Coast Guard and the Libyan Navy, fighting human trafficking, and stopping illicit exports of Libyan oil.
Multiple European dimensions
Operation “Irini” constituted a multi-dimensional European strategy within the “Mediterranean sphere,” as it attempted to monopolize the application of international law according to a special context and without coordination with the rest of the Mediterranean countries that were previously European colonies. Its basic indicators show that European maritime surveillance focused on drawing the features of power within The Libyan scene, through naval patrols, sought to establish a specific “security belt” to form balances between the Libyan forces that emerged after the killing of President Muammar Gaddafi. Operation “Irini” can be viewed according to three basic axes:
- The geographical scope of its operations: Marine patrols operate about 100 kilometers from the Libyan coast and are concentrated in the eastern part of Libyan waters, while the western part, which to this day still contains extremist armed groups, remains far from maritime control.
European concern about the Libyan East can be understood as a result of the nature of the international clash, and the nature of the contact with Egypt in the first place, which constituted a strategic factor not only during the Libyan war, but also in the subsequent stages. The East is the gateway to alliances outside the scope of the European Union, and the political power that emerged in Benghazi through… The interim government and the General Command of the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, showed a cohesion different from the Tripoli government, which reflects the balance of factions present there, in addition to being a meeting point for European interests.
- The Focus on maritime surveillance: which reflects geopolitical control over the Mediterranean to ensure security and stability in southern Europe. Focusing on the maritime domain allows the European Union to enhance its security control and monitoring of the activities of ships and shipments that pass through this vital region.
Although illegal immigration is a goal of Operation “Irini”, it is clear that the European movement sees this issue as part of the geostrategic control over the maritime routes of the Mediterranean Basin. There is a tendency to make this basin closed to all other international powers, and on the other hand, it allows dealing with the northern gateway to the African continent. Generally.
- Working from outside the Security Council: Although the process, in its broad title, seeks to implement Security Council resolutions regarding the ban on the entry of weapons into Libya, it remains a distinctly European initiative and reflects an approach that is not compatible with global or even African positions on the mechanism for dealing with the Libyan issue.
The position of Russia’s representative to the Security Council, Vasily Nebenzia, a year after Operation “Irini” explains the nature of the European strategy towards Libya, as he considered that it did not achieve tangible results during a session of the UN Security Council on May 12, 2021, indicating its failure to achieve its goals. The main objective is to effectively implement the arms embargo on Libya, or prevent their flow, which has contributed to the continuation of conflict and instability in the country.
- Selectivity in inspection procedures: which take place in specific areas, and maritime patrols deal with monitoring or confiscation operations in non-transparent ways. The operation itself was questionable due to its nature linked to European interests in Libya.
Bias in inspection appears to be part of the operating mechanism, as patrols focus more on ships transporting suspected weapons to factions opposing the Libyan government in Tripoli, while turning a blind eye to shipments by some parties in western Libya. There are questions about the extent of the transparency of the process and how reports on the results of the inspection are presented. And the procedures you follow.
“Irini” and the Turkish military role in Libya
Since the beginning of the conflict in Libya, Turkey has been a major supporter of the Government of National Accord by supplying weapons and military equipment and providing training and logistical support. Ankara has directly intervened militarily in Libya, including sending military advisors, special forces, and attack drones. This intervention led to… Changing the balance of power on the ground, especially in the battles for Tripoli.
Despite the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations, Turkey continued to supply the Government of National Accord with weapons, and many cases of arms transfers across the sea were documented, which Operation Irini seeks to prevent. This intervention contributed to increasing the complexity of the Libyan conflict and led to the strengthening of divisions. Since the signing of the security and military cooperation agreement with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli in November 2019, this agreement has enabled Turkey to provide direct military support to Tripoli, such as drones and military advisors to support the forces of the Government of National Accord.
In addition to the military agreement, Turkey and the Government of National Accord signed an agreement to demarcate maritime borders in the Mediterranean, which enabled Turkey to strengthen its influence in areas rich in natural gas, and Operation “Irini” was unable to prevent the flow of Turkish weapons to the Government of National Accord due to the nature of the Turkish regional role in the Mediterranean Basin. In general, in the end, “Irini” deals with another balance with the eastern Mediterranean, which is completely different from the coast of North Africa, and it views its areas of influence in the Mediterranean basin from the angles of international entanglement, and Turkey is more than just a country in NATO, because it is also part From a geographical belt with Russia and the Black Sea, it sought to isolate the Libyan conflict from Europe, and embodied a control strategy to deal with the Libyan balance in the first place and with North Africa in general.
Written by Mazen Bilal
Libyan consultant: There is no seriousness in dealing with the Libyan file by international parties